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Introduction
On May 5, 1992, the United States proposed that the Hague Conference
on Private International Law draft a new convention regarding the recog-
nition and enforcement of civil and commercial judgments.' The United
States made the proposal because it is not a party to any bilateral or multi-
lateral agreement governing such judgments.2 As a result of this solitary
1. The United States proposed that the Hague Conference on Private Interna-
tional Law [hereinafter Hague Conference] "resume work in the field of recognition
and enforcement ofjudgments with a view to preparing a single convention to which
Hague Conference Member States and other countries might become parties." Letter
from Edwin D. Williamson, legal advisor of the U.S. Department of State, to Georges
Droz, secretary general of The Hague Conference (May 5, 1992), Hague Conference
Doc. No. Lc. ON No 15 (92).
The Hague Conference is a multilateral organization comprised of 39 member coun-
tries. Founded in 1893, it serves as a negotiating forum for civil and commercial legal
matters. The United States became a member in 1964. 22 U.S.C. § 269(g) (1988). For
a desciption of why the United States joined the Hague Conference, see U.S. Participa-
tion in the Hague Conference and the Rome Institute: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interna-
tional Organizations and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 88th Cong., 1st
Sess. on HJ. Res. 732 (1963) [hereinafter Hearing]. For further information on the
Hague Conference, see Peter H. Pfund, The Hague Conference Celebrates Its 100th Anniver-
sary, 28 TEx. INT'L LJ. 531 (1993); Peter H. Pfund, International Unification of Private
Law: A Report on United States Participation, 1985-1986, 20 INT'L LAw. 623 (1986); Peter H.
Pfund, United States Participation in International Unfication of Private Law, 19 INT'L LAW.
505 (1985); and Comment, The United States and the Hague Conferences on Private Interna-
tional Law, 1 AM. J. COMp. L. 268 (1952).
2. The United States is a party to the New York Convention, a convention gov-
erning the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. United Nations Conven-
tion on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards,June 10, 1958, 21
U.S.T. 2517, T.I.A.S. No. 6997, 330 U.N.T.S. 38.
There are several multilateral civil and commercial judgment treaties in force: The
Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil and Commer-
cial Matters, 1972 O.J. (L 299) 32, 29 I.L.M. 1413 (1990) (signed in 1968 and known as
the Brussels Convention, it was amended three times to accommodate new European
Union member-states as all European Union member-states are signatories) [hereinaf-
ter Brussels Convention]; The Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1988 O.J. (L 319) 9, 28 I.L.M. 620 (1989)
(signed in 1972 and known as the Lugano Convention, its signatories are the European
Free Trade Association and European Union member-states) [hereinafter Lugano Con-
vention]; The Inter-American Convention on Jurisdiction in the International Sphere
for the Extraterritorial Validity of Foreign Judgments, OAS Treaty Ser. No. A/39, 24
I.L.M. 468 (1985) (signed in 1984, its signatories include most of the members of the
Organization of American States) [hereinafter Inter-American Convention]; and Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil and Com-
mercial Matters, Feb. 1, 1971, available in CONFtRENCE DE LA HAVE DE DRorr
INTERNATIONAL PRIvt, REcuEL DES CONVENTIONS (1951-1988) 107 (1989) (drafted by
the Hague Conference, it was signed only by the Netherlands, Portugal, and Cyprus)
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approach to recognition and enforcement matters, U.S. litigants have a
severe disadvantage in the global legal system. The U.S. federal and state
judiciaries will enforce any judgment3 that is valid and fair,4 but foreign
[hereinafter 1971 Hague Convention]. For details regarding these agreements, see
infra part IA and note 32.
The United States and the United Kingdom initialed but did not sign a bilateral
judgment treaty in 1976. See Convention Between the United Kingdom of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland and the United States of America Providing for the Reciprocal
Recognition and Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil Matters (Ad referendum text), ini-
tialed Oct. 26, 1976, 16 I.L.M. 71 (1977) [hereinafter UK-US Convention]. The Conven-
tion was only initialed by its negotiators and never signed or ratified by the countries
because of differences over the enforcement of large U.S. punitive damage awards. For
a description of the Convention and an explanation of its failure, see David Luther
Woodward, Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Judgments in the United States, the
United Kingdom and the European Economic Community, 8 N.C.J. INr'TL L. & COM. REG. 299,
310-14 (1983); Arthur Taylor von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Sister-State Judg-
ments: Reflections on General Theory and Current Practice in the European Economic Commu-
nity and the United States, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1044, 1060 n.61 (1981); and Peter Hay &
RobertJ. Walker, The Proposed U.S.-U.K. Recognition-ofJudgments Convention: Another Per-
spective, 18 VA. J. INT'L. L. 753 (1978).
3. For the purpose of clarity, the term "judgment" includes both the recognition
and enforcement of a final judicial determination, unless otherwise specified. There is
a difference, procedurally, between recognition and enforcement:
A foreign judgment is recognized when a court concludes that a certain matter
has already been decided by the judgment and therefore need not be litigated
further. A foreign judgment is enforced when a party is accorded the relief to
which thejudgment entitles him. No foreign judgment can be enforced until it
has been recognized, but in many cases, a party seeks only recognition, not
enforcement, of a foreign judgment. For example, in a local action, a defend-
ant may raise, as a partial or even a complete defense, a foreign judgment in his
favor, likewise, he may rely upon a foreign judgment, such as a declaratoryjudg-
ment or a determination of status, that does not itself entitle him to affirmative
relief. The distinction between these terms is significant because foreign-coun-
try judgments usually cannot themselves be enforced directly in the United
States, but first must be reduced to ajudgment of a U.S. court. Thus, there may
be situations in which U.S. courts will recognize a foreign judgment, in the
sense that they will give effect to matters decided, but nonetheless will not
grant, or will modify, the affirmative relief granted by the foreign court.
Robert B. von Mehren & Michael E. Patterson, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign
County Judgments in the United States, 6 LAw & PoL'Y INT'L Bus. 37, 38 (1974) (footnote
omitted).
4. Both federal and state courts generally have followed the rule set by the U.S.
Supreme Court in 1885 in Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1885). The Court held:
[Wihere there has been opportunity for a full and fair trial abroad before a
court of competentjurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular proceedings,
after due citation or voluntary appearance of the defendant, and under a sys-
tem of jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of justice
between the citizens of its own country and those of other countries, and there
is nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in the system of laws under
which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the judgment, or any other special
reason why the comity of this nation should not allow it full effect, the merits of
the case should not, in an action brought in this country upon the judgment,
be tried afresh, as on a new trial or an appeal, upon the mere assertion of the
party that the judgment was erroneous in law or in fact.
Id. at 202-03.
Most states follow Hilton and have a common law comity approach to recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments. See, e.g., Fredericks v. Eide-Kirschmann Ford, 462
N.W.2d 164, 170 (N.D. 1990)
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(When the enforcement of ajudgment as a matter of comity is in issue, absent a
showing of prejudice, fraud "or other special reason why comity of this nation
should not allow it full effect, the merits of the case should not ... be tried
afresh ... upon the mere assertion of the party that the judgment was errone-
ous in law or in fact.
(quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. at 202-03)); Rotary Club v. Chaprales Ramos de
Pena, 160 Ariz. 362, 364 (1989) ("It is clear that the Arizona courts are not required to
give full faith and credit to judgments of foreign nations.").
Some states, such as New York, rejected Hilton as controlling state recognition and
enforcement. See Johnston v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 242 N.Y. 381
(1926) (holding that Hilton is not controlling in New York. The recognition and
enforcement of foreign judgments is a question of "private rather than public law," and
New York courts "will recognize private rights acquired under foreign laws and the suffi-
ciency of the evidence establishing such rights." Id. at 387).
New York, however, has since joined with 21 other states (Alaska, California, Colo-
rado, Connecticut, Georgia, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, Missouri, New Mexico, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vir-
ginia, and Washington (and the Virgin Islands), UNIF. FOREIGN MONEY-JUDGMENTS Acr,
13 U.LA 261-75 (1986 & 1993 Supp. 51-59)) and enacted the Uniform Foreign Money-
Judgments Recognition Act. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. §§ 5301-5309 (McKinney 1978 and
Supp. 1994). For more on the Act, see GARY B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS 781-86 (2d ed. 1992).
There is no uniform federal and state law regarding the recognition and enforce-
ment of foreign judgments because Congress has not exercised its authority to regulate
such judgments. Congress has such authority by means of the commerce clause, which
gives Congress the "[plower... [t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. By
this clause,
Congress has no less authority over foreign commerce than it has over inter-
state commerce. And since the revolution initiated by [NLRB v.Jones & Laugh-
lin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937)] .... under the commerce power Congress
can reach all interstate or foreign "intercourse"; [sic] it can reach matters pre-
cedent to or subsequent to interstate or foreign commerce; it can reach what
relates to or affects as well as what is commerce; it can reach strictly local com-
merce and activities when necessary to make effective regulation of interstate or
foreign commerce. The power of Congress over foreign commerce would
then, of itself, support legislation equivalent to a large part of the law "enacted"
by treaty.... For, generally, the law of the land enacted by the traditional
treaties deals with the rights of aliens in the United States, and regulation of the
rights of aliens in these respects would today, it appears, be held to be within
congressional authority.... So, for example, Congress has assured that aliens,
like citizens, shall be entitled "to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all law and proceedings for
the security of persons and property... and shall be subject to like punish-
ment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no
other."
Louis Henkin, The Treaty Makers and the Law Makers: The Law of the Land and Foreign
Relations, 107 U. PA. L. Rxv. 903, 915-16 (1959) (quoting The Civil Rights Act of 1870,
16 Stat. 144, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1952)) (footnotes omitted).
Congress has the means to regulate international trade by either statute or treaty.
The treaty method originates in Article I, which ordains that the President "shall have
Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate to make Treaties, provided
two thirds of the Senators present concur." U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. The various
Hague Conventions which the United States has signed and ratified are examples of
Congress exercising its treaty power. Treaties, by means of the supremacy clause, have
the effect of federal statutes: "[A] 11 Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in
every State shall be bound thereby." U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2.
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countries are reticent to enforce U.S. federal and state judgments.5 Thus,
foreign plaintiffs easily have their judgments satisfied against U.S. defend-
ants, but U.S. plaintiffs are often left with emptyjudgments. The U.S. pro-
posal to the Hague Conference was intended to end this unequal legal
situation.
While the United States made its proposal to the Hague Conference,
Harry L. (Butch) Reynolds, Jr. was fighting the International Amateur Ath-
letic Federation (IAAF) and its U.S. representative, The Athletics Congress
(TAC), for the right to compete in the 1992 United States Track and Field
Olympic Trials, and eventually in the 1992 Barcelona Olympic Games. 6
The full faith and credit clause requires that states enforce the judgments of other
states: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records,
and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws
prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof." U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1. Congress exercised its authority to
facilitate the recognition and enforcement of sister-state judgments when in 1948 it
revised Title 28, Judiciary and Judicial Procedure, and included § 1738. Act of'June 25,
1948, ch. 646, 62 Stat. 947 (1948) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1988)).
Guyot, incidentally, lost. Although the Supreme Court found that he had a right to
recognition and enforcement by means of international comity, 159 U.S. at 163-64, he
could not require the exercise of that right because his country, France, refused to
recognize and enforce U.S.judgments without a merit review. Id. at 227-28. Therefore,
U.S. courts could, in the absence of a federal statute or treaty, cease to recognize and
enforce foreign judgments at any time. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF
LAWs §§ 98, 100 (1988) and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 482 (1987).
5. A famous example is Lord Reid's speech to the House of Lords during delibera-
tions in Broome v. Cassell & Co., [1972] App. Case 1027, 1087, 1 All E.R. 801, 835:
I think that the objections to allowingjuries to go beyond compensatory dam-
ages are overwhelming. To allow pure punishment in this way contravenes
almost every principle which has been evolved for the protection of offenders.
There is no definition of the offence except that the conduct punished must be
oppressive, high-handed, malicious, wanton or its like-terms far too vague to
be admitted to any criminal code worthy of the name. There is no limit to the
punishment except that it must not be unreasonable. The punishment is not
inflicted by a judge who has experience and at least tries not to be influenced
by emotion: it is inflicted by ajury without experience of law or punishment
and often swayed by considerations which every judge would put out of his
mind. And there is no effective appeal against sentence. All that a reviewing
court can do is to quash the jury's decision if it thinks the punishment awarded
is more than any twelve reasonable men could award. The court cannot substi-
tute its own award. The punishment must then be decided by anotherjury and
if they too award heavy punishment the court is virtually powerless. It is no
excuse to say that we need not waste sympathy on people who behave outra-
geously. Are we wasting sympathy on vicious criminals when we insist on
proper legal safeguards for them? The right to give punitive damages in certain
cases is so firmly embedded in our law that only Parliament can remove it. But
I must say that I am surprised by the enthusiasm of Lord Devlin's critics for this
form of palm tree justice.
See also infra note 181 and accompanying text.
6. The International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF) is the international
track and field governing organization: "The IAAF shall comprise duly elected national
governing bodies for amateur athletics which agree to abide by the rules and regula-
tions of the IAAF." Rule 2, The International Amateur Athletic Federation, INTERNA-
TIONAL AMATEUR ATHLETIC FEDERATION, OFIAic HANDBOOK 1994-1995, at 37 (1994)
[hereinafter IAAF OFFICIAL HANDBOOK]. The International Olympic Committee (IOC)
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The IAAF barred Reynolds from competing for two years for failing an
recognizes the IAAF as the official track and field (known outside the U.S. as "athletics,"
hence International Amateur Athletic Federation) international governing body (called
international federation or IF). See Rule 4, Recognition by the IOC, INTERNATIONAL
OLYMPIC COMMITTEE, OLYMPIC CHARTER 14 (1992) [hereinafter OLYMPIC CHARTER]
("The IOC may recognize IFs according to the conditions laid down in Rule 29."); Rule
29, Recognition of the IFs, id. at 39
(In order to promote the Olympic Movement, the IOC may recognize as IFs
international non-governmental organizations administering one or several
sports at world level and encompassing organizations administering such sports
at national level.
As far as the role of the IFs within the Olympic Movement is concerned, their
statutes, practice and activities must be in conformity with the Olympic Charter.
Subject to the foregoing, each IF maintains its independence and autonomy in
the administration of its sport.);
Rule 30, Role [of the IFs], id.
1 The role of the IFs is to:
1.1 establish and enforce the rules concerning the practice of their
respective sports and to ensure their application;
1.2 ensure the development of their sports throughout the world;
1.3 contribute to the achievement of the goals set out in the Olympic
Charter;
1.4 establish their criteria of eligibility to enter the competitions of the
Olympic Games in conformity with the Olympic Charter, and to submit
these to the IOC for approval;
1.5 assume the responsibility for the technical control and direction of
their sports at the Olympic Games and at Games under the patronage of
the IOC;
1.6 provide technical assistance in the practical implementation of the
Olympic Solidarity programme.
The IAAF was based in London until October, 1993 when it moved to Monte Carlo,
Monaco. John Rodda, Athletics: Staff Stunned as IAAF Decides to Leave London Offices,
GuARDIAN, Sept. 28, 1993, at 18.
All countries desiring to compete in the Olympics must have a National Olympic
Committee (NOC). Rule 31(3), Mission and Role of the NOCs, OLYMPIC CHARTER,
supra, at 41 ("The NOCs have the exclusive powers for the representation of their
respective countries at the Olympic Games and at the regional, continental or world
multi-sports competitions patronized by the IOC."). See also Chapter 4, The National
Olympic Committees, id. at 41-48. The United States Olympic Committee (USOC) is
the U.S. NOC. 36 U.S.C. §§ 371-395 (1988). See also UNrrED STATES OLYMPIC COMMIT-
TEE, UNITED STATES OLYMPIC COMMITrEE CONSTrrrrION AND BYLAws (1992) [hereinafter
USOC CONsrrTION].
Furthermore, every sport must have a national governing body, also known as a
national federation. Rule 33, The National Federations, OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra, at 47
("To be recognized by an NOC and accepted as a member of such NOC, a national
federation must be affiliated to an IF recognized by the IOC and conduct its activities in
compliance with both the Olympic Charter and the rules of its IF."). The IAAF, there-
fore, provides a means of membership for national governing bodies: "The national
governing body for amateur athletics in any country or territory shall be eligible for
Membership." Rule 4, Membership, IAAF OFFcLAL HANDBOOK, supra, at 38.
In the U.S., the USOC recognizes the national governing bodies. 36 U.S.C. § 391
(1988) ("For any sport which is included on the program of the Olympic Games[,j ...
[the USOC] is authorized to recognize as a national governing body an amateur sports
organization which files an application and is eligible for such recognition.. . "). The
USOC recognized The Athletics Congress (TAC) (renamed USA Track and Field on
December 5, 1992. Jim Terhune, New Name Doean't Necessarily Rid TAC of Some Old Issues,
CouIEg-JouRNAL, Dec. 6, 1992, at Cll.) as the U.S. national governing body for track
and field. Appendix-List of Members, Olympic and Pan-American Sport Organiza-
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anti-doping steroid test in 1990.7 Protesting his innocence, Reynolds
fought his ban, which would prevent him from competing in the 1992
Barcelona Olympics, in the TAC, IAAF, and U.S. adjudicative fora.8
Although Reynolds won the right to compete in the Olympic Trials,9 he
was defeated in the 400 meter run qualifying final.1 0 The IAAF, which
opposed Reynolds's competing in the Trials, extended his ban through
1992 to punish his disobedience.11 Reynolds sued the IAAF in U.S. district
court for contractual interference and won a $27.3 million judgment.12
The IAAF refuses to recognize U.S. (or any country's) judicial juris-
diction, 13 and therefore, it refused to pay Reynolds.14 Reynolds turned to
garnishing the IAAF's U.S. sponsors' quarterly dues in order to satisfy the
judgment.' 5 Reynolds did not directly attempt to attach IAAF assets
located outside the United States or to garnish its foreign sponsors' dues.
The IAAF did not appear in the district court adjudication.' 6 It was
forced to appeal on the only available ground: lack of jurisdiction. The
Sixth Circuit agreed with the IAAF that the Federation was not subject to
personal jurisdiction in Ohio, reversed the damages award, and dismissed
the case. 17 The Sixth Circuit denied the motion to rehear the case en
banc,18 and the Supreme Court denied Reynolds's petition for
tions, USOC CONSTITUTION, supra, at 54. The IAAF also recognized TAC as the official
U.S. national governing body. List of Members, IAAF OFFICIAL HANDBOOK, supra, at 25.
7. Reynolds Out of Mony, Out of Races, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1992, at B2.
8. Id. See infra part II and text accompanying footnotes 115-37. See also Vernon A.
Nelson, Jr., Comment, Butch Reynolds and the American Judicial System v. The International
Amateur Athletic Federation-A Comment on the Need for Judicial Restrain, 3 SEToN HALLJ.
SPORT L. 173 (1993).
9. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 841 F. Supp. 1444 (S.D. Ohio
1992) [hereinafter Reynolds D].
10. Reynolds placed fifth in the 400 meter final. Kenny Moore, The Short Arm of the
Law, SPORTS ILLus., July 6, 1992, at 98.
11. Tom Cushman, Reynolds wraps up tale of lAAFpersecution, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB.,
Dec. 12, 1993, at C-1.
12. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, No. 92-00452 (S.D. Ohio
Nov. 1992).
13. When Reynolds was suing the IAAF in order to compete in the Olympic Trials,
IAAF President Primo Nebiolo said the IAAF "will never accept a decision of any court
in the world against our rules." Moore, supra note 10. See alsojerry Kirshenbaum, ed.,
Scorecard, SPORTS ILLus., July 26, 1993, at 9.
14. Asked whether the IAAF will pay Reynolds the award, IAAF President Primo
Nebiolo replied, "Never, never. He can live 200 years." Jerry Kirshenbaum, Kiss, Kiss,
SPORTS ILLus., Sept. 6, 1993, at 21.
15. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, No. C-2-92-452 (S.D. Ohio
Feb. 1993) (motion for garnishment). See also Andrew Blum, Athlete Wins Round With
Olympic Sponsors, NAT'L L. J., Sept. 13, 1993, at 6.
16. See Reynolds H, 841 F. Supp. at 1447; Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic
Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110, 1113-14 (6th Cir. 1994) (The IAAF did not respond to Reynolds's
complaint and TAC did not appear in the default proceedings. After the IAAF was
given full notice, the court entered a defaultjudgment in Reynolds's favor. Soon after-
ward, the district court held a hearing to determine damages. Again, the IAAF was
provided notice but refused to appear.).
17. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 1994).
18. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, No. 93-3884, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 16815 (6th Cir. July 7, 1994).
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certiorari.' 9
This Note analyzes how Reynolds could have exercised jurisdiction
over the IAAF and enforced his judgment through the proposed Hague
Convention had this new treaty been in force. First, this Note describes
the U.S. proposal and the current status of negotiations. Second, this
Note discusses the jurisdiction, garnishment, and enforcement aspects of
the Reynolds suit. Finally, this Note analyzes whether Reynolds would
have been able to use the proposed Hague Convention (had it been in
force), and suggests areas that the United States must require the Hague
Convention to include so as to guarantee jurisdiction and enforcement,
both domestic and foreign, of a future Reynods°-type decision.
Reynolds's case is an ideal case to use in analyzing the U.S. proposal.
The IAAF is an unincorporated foreign juridical entity, claims judicial
immunity,2' has a U.S. agent, conducts operations in the United States,
affects U.S. citizens, and affects them in a significant financial manner.
The IAAF is the epitome of the foreign defendant which conducts substan-
tial business in the United States but is able to avoid U.S. justice. The
proposed Hague Convention must be drafted to ensure jurisdiction over
the IAAF and enforcement of awards against it wherever the IAAF con-
ducts business or retains assets. If the proposed Hague Convention can
permit a court to assume jurisdiction and enforcement power over the
IAAF, then such a court can assume those powers over virtually any duly-
constituted corporation operating internationally. The exercise of such
power is in every country's best interest.
I. The Proposed Hague Convention
The impetus for the U.S. proposal arose from the isolated position the
United States occupies in the global judgments scheme. The United
States is not a party to any bilateral or multilateral treaty governing recog-
nition and enforcement of civil and commercialjudgments. 22 The contra-
dictory situation of the liberal U.S. due process standards and foreign
reluctance to enforce U.S. judgments results in a legal imbalance: the
United States enforces almost all foreign judgments23 but sees its judg-
ments routinely rejected abroad. The increasing amount of international
litigation concerning U.S. parties spurred the Department of State to sug-
gest the Hague Conference prepare a treaty that would right the imbal-
ance. 24 This part of the Note describes types ofjudgment agreements in
19. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 115 S. Ct. 423 (1994).
20. Reynolds I, 841 F. Supp. 1444 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
21. See Moore, supra note 10.
22. See supra note 2.
23. See supra note 4.
24. The United States chose to negotiate through the Hague Conference because
its 39 members include the largest U.S. trading partners (the European Union and
European Free Trade Association countries, as well as Canada, China, Israel,Japan, and
Mexico). Furthermore, the Conference does not include states which are not only hos-
tile to the United States, such as Iran, but which also have extremely different legal
systems, such as Saudi Arabia. In that country, for example, the Board of Grievances
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existence, current agreements in force as well as past attempts, and ana-
lyzes the U.S. proposal for a new convention.
A. Types of Conventions
The civil and commercial judgment conventions negotiated thus far have
been either conventions simples or conventions doubles. The purpose of a
judgment agreement is to provide for regularity and thus ease of enforce-
ment.2 5 Such an agreement transcends different legal systems and
national cultures; signatory countries may have to sacrifice laws or parts of
their systems in order to reach an agreement. Thus, the agreements rep-
resent the common ground of signatory states' legal systems.
1. Convention simple
A convention simple is a traditional type of judgment convention. 26 It
addresses only recognition and enforcement. A judgment resting on a
jurisdictional basis provided for in the convention is entitled to recogni-
tion and enforcement. If a court assumes jurisdiction on a basis not pro-
vided for in the convention, the enforcing court has the discretion
whether to recognize the judgment or noL2 7
"has the power to enforce foreign court judgments in commercial matters, so long as
they do not contravene the basic tenets of Islam and the foreign country involved recip-
rocally enforces Saudi judgments." U.S. DEARTMENT OF STATE, 1990 Human Rights
Report, Saudi Arabia, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE DISPATCH, Feb. 1, 1991, at 7. Negotiating
through the United Nations would have involved dealing with these counties, and the
chances of achieving an acceptable treaty were essentially negligible.
25. See Hearing, supra note 1.
26. For information on the different types ofjudgment conventions, see Louis B.
Sohn, General Information Form 109A, Dec. 11, 1992, American Bar Association Sec-
tion of International Law and Practice (on file with the Cornell International Law
Journa).
27. The 1971 Hague Convention, supra note 2, is a convention simple Jurisdiction
exists in the rendering forum if: this is the defendant's habitual residence (or is the
place of incorporation or principal place of business); the defendant has a commercial
presence; at issue is immovable property located in the forum; a tort occurred in the
forum; the forum was chosen in a forum selection agreement; the defendant did not
challengejurisdiction; or the defendant was the plaintiff in a prior action regarding this
issue in the forum. Art. 10, id.
The terms of recognition and enforcement are simple and strict:
A decision rendered in one of the Contracting States shall be entitled to recog-
nition and enforcement in another Contracting State under the terms of this
Convention-
(1) if the decision was given by a court considered to have jurisdiction
within the meaning of this Convention, and
(2) if it is no longer subject to ordinary forms of review in the State of
origin.
In addition, to be enforceable in the State addressed, a decision must be
enforceable in the State of origin.
Art. 4, id.
This convention was negotiated under the auspices of the Hague Conference. Its
only signatories are the Netherlands, Portugal, and Cyprus. The convention is not in
force because these states did not execute the required bilateral accords. They did not
do so because the Brussels Convention was completed almost simultaneously, and it
essentially superseded the 1971 Hague Convention. The 1971 Hague Convention is not
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2. Convention double
A convention double governs both the assumption of jurisdiction and the
recognition and enforcement of the resulting judgment. 2 8 A "white list"
details the acceptable jurisdiction bases.2 9 A case resting on an accepted
basis fulfills the convention's jurisdictional requirement for recognition
and enforcement. In a narrow convention double, the white list bases are
exclusive.
A broader convention double also contains a "black list" of prohibited
jurisdictional bases.30 If a rendering court does assume jurisdiction on a
black list basis, the enforcing court must, however, still recognize and
enforce the judgment because it is not allowed to review the rendering
court's assumption of jurisdiction.3 1 A broad convention thus permits
contracting states to assume jurisdiction on bases not detailed in the white
list.3 2
suitable for amending as it limits itself to recognition and enforcement. Furthermore,
it is doubtful that the United States would be able to reach bilateral agreements with all
signatory countries.
The United States and the United Kingdom initialed a bilateral judgment treaty in
1976, the UK-US Convention, supra note 2, but never signed nor ratified the agree-
ment. The convention failed even though punitive damages were excluded: "(2) ...
this Convention shall not apply tojudgments: (b) to the extent that they are for puni-
tive or multiple damages." Art. 2, id.
Jurisdiction in the UK-US Convention exists if: the defendant was the original plain-
tiff- the defendant's habitual residence (or principal place of business or incorpora-
tion) was within the rendering forum; the defendant had a branch office or other
establishment (other than a subsidiary) in the forum and the action arises from this
activity relating to the office; the forum was specified in a forum selection agreement;
the action arises from the conduct of defendant's business in the forum; an advertise-
ment was made in the forum regarding the supply of goods or services; if the action
pertains to determining rights of ownership, if the object is located in the forum; the
principal place of a trust's administration is the forum (or the trust specifies the forum)
for actions regarding the trust; and a tort occurred in the forum. Art. 10, id.
Recognition and enforcement is as simple and as strict as in the 1971 Hague
Convention:
(1) Ajudgment... shall... be recognized... if-
(a) it was given by a court havingjurisdiction under Articles 10 or 11; and
(b) it has binding effects within the territory of origin, notwithstanding
that an application for review may be pending against it, or that it may still
be subject to review, in that territory.
Art. 4, id. (Article 11 pertains to counterclaims. Art. 11, id.).
The UK-US Convention excludes judgments "for punitive or multiple damages" and
"determining questions relating to damage or injury resulting from a nuclear incident."
Art. 2, id. These exclusions represent British nervousness regarding large U.S. tort
awards; the United States had to exclude these areas in order to conclude the Conven-
tion. Even so, the British refused to sign and ratify the accord.
28. See Sohn, supra note 26, at 4, 7-8.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Art. 28, para. 3, Brussels Convention, supra note 2.
32. There are three conventions doubles currently in force. The first convention was
the Brussels Convention. All European Union members must be a party to this treaty,
and as a result it has been amended three times when the EC expanded its member-
ship: for the United Kingdom, Denmark, and Ireland in 1978 (29 I.L.M. 1416 n.1) for
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B. The United States Proposal
The United States proposed that Hague Conference member states nego-
tiate a novel agreement intended to "apply in civil and commercial matters
whatever the nature of the court or tribunal."3 3 The proposal3 4 incorpo-
Greece in 1982 (id.), and for Spain and Portugal in 1989 (id.). Article 220 of the Treaty
of Rome required the founding EC countries to negotiate a judgment treaty. The
Treaty of Rome Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, 298
U.N.T.S. 3. Article 63 of the Brussels Convention requires new EC states "to accept this
Convention as a basis for the negotiations between the Contracting States and that State
necessary to ensure the implementation of the last paragraph of Article 220 of the
Treaty establishing the European Economic Community." Art. 63, Brussels Conven-
tion, supra note 2. The Brussels Convention details permitted bases on which a render-
ing court may exercise jurisdiction. Arts. 2-10 contain the bases for jurisdiction. Id.
The general rule regarding recognition is that the courts of one state are required to
recognize the judgments of another member state, with very limited exceptions. Arts.
26-28, id.
United States defendants increasingly are finding themselves caught in the Brussels
Convention's web of exorbitant"jurisdiction. Although such jurisdiction is proscribed
for member states' defendants, it is not for non-contracting state parties. Thus U.S.
defendants are being forced to litigate, often unfairly, in a contracting state and see the
judgment be enforced-as required-throughout the rest of the EC. The United
States hopes to limit this "exorbitantjurisdiction" in the proposed Hague Convention.
The second convention double multilateral treaty mirrors the Brussels Convention. In
1988 the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) and the EC countries signed the
Lugano Convention. See supra note 2. The Brussels and Lugano Conventions are essen-
tially identical.
The current European situation is therefore that the Brussels Convention governs a
dispute between EU parties and an EU party and a non-EU or non-EFTA party, and the
Lugano Convention governs disputes between EU and EFTA parties, intra-EFTA par-
ties, and between an EFTA party and a non-EU or non-EFTA party.
The third convention double is the Inter-American Convention. See supra note 2.
Signed in 1984, its signatories include (most of the) members of the Organization of
American States (OAS). Although the United States proposed that the OAS negotiate
this treaty, it did not sign the convention.
33. Draft Convention On Jurisdiction and the Enforcement ofJudgments in Civil
and Commercial Matters, Title I (Scope), Art. 1 [hereinafter Draft Convention or
United States proposal] (on file with the Cornel International LawJournal).
Article 1 continues:
It shall not extend, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative matters.
The Convention shall not apply to:
1. the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising
out of a matrimonial relationship, wills and succession;
2. bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent compa-
nies or other legal persons,judicial arrangements, compositions and analo-
gous proceedings;
3. social security;
4. arbitration.
Id. This is the exact language used in the Brussels and Lugano Conventions. Art. 1,
Brussels Convention, supra note 2; Art. 1, Lugano Convention, supra note 2.
34. The Draft Convention was prepared by the United States at the request of the
Hague Conference but was required to be vague so as to not cause prejudices and
disputes at the outset of discussions on whether to place the proposal on the Hague
Conference's agenda. The introductory paragraph to the Draft Convention notes:
"The structure and basic provisions of a Hague Convention dealing with recognition
and enforcement should parallel, to the extent feasible, the Brussels and Lugano Con-
ventions. The following draft is based on the Lugano Convention." Introductory para-
graph, Draft Convention, supra note 33.
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rates aspects of traditional judgment conventions but adds a special area
intended to facilitate compromise and agreement. The proposal, which
met with interest from the Hague Conference Permanent Bureau3 5 and
enthusiasm from a special expert working group,36 encountered opposi-
tion at the 17th Hague Conference session. 37 The Europeans enjoy their
dominant position in the status quo and appear reluctant to accept
change.
1. Contents of the United States Proposal
The United States proposed a convention mixte (mixed convention), which
includes provisions for both the assumption of jurisdiction and the
requirements for recognition and enforcement.3 8 "The United States
considered that a mixed convention would improve the present situation
but would not interfere with practices that States might consider neces-
sary. For this reason [it] had chosen a 'mixed' convention as opposed to
either a 'single' or 'double' convention." 39
a. The "White List"
As in a convention double, a convention mixte contains a white list detailing
specific grounds upon which a court may base its assumption of jurisdic-
tion. If a court assumes jurisdiction pursuant to the white list, other con-
tracting parties must accept that assumption of jurisdiction as valid and
proceed to recognize and enforce the judgment.
The white list bases of jurisdiction are not specifically delineated in
the Draft Convention. Using references to other Conventions in the draft,
it is possible to outline three broad white list categories.
First, "persons domiciled in a Contracting State may, whatever their
nationality, be sued in the courts of the jurisdiction in which they are dom-
iciled."4° This clause is standard jurisdiction language and can be found
For a broad outline of the reasons for the proposal and the convention mixte format,
see Arthur T. von Mehren, Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, A New
Approach for the Hague Convention?, 57 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 271 (1994). For a cri-
tique of von Mehren's idea, see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Thoughts About a Multinational
Judgments Convention: A Reaction to the von Mehren Report, 57 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBs. 289
(1994). For further commentary on the need for a global judgment treaty, see Matthew
H. Adler, If We Build It, Will They Come? The Need for a Multilateral Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Civil Monetay Judgments, 26 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 79
(1989).
35. See Some reflections of the Permanent Bureau on a general convention on
enforcement ofjudgments, Preliminary Document No. 17 of May 1992.
36. Conclusions of the Working Group meeting on enforcement ofjudgments, Pre-
liminary Document No. 19 of November 1992.
37. Hague Conference on Private International Law: Final Act of the 17th Session,
32 I.L.M. 1134 (1993) [hereinafter Final Act].
38. Titles II and III, Draft Convention, supra note 33.
39. Arthur von Mehren, Minutes No. 3, Commission I, Seventeenth Session, Hague
Conference on Private International Law, Meeting of 20 May 1993, at I (on file with the
Cornell International Law Journal).
40. Art. 2, Draft Convention, supra note 33. Neither the Draft Convention nor the
other judgment conventions define what legally constitutes "domicile." In fact, in the
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in almost every country's law and every judgment treaty's jurisdiction sec-
tion.41 It does, however, raise federalism issues in its application to the
United States. The article permits a plaintiff to sue a defendant in the
latter's domiciliary jurisdiction. This raises a question in the United
States: does 'jurisdiction" mean federal or state court? Clearly a domicili-
ary is amenable to suit in federal court based on the diversity statute.
4 2
The Draft Convention is also applicable to state courts by means of the
supremacy clause.43 Thus, if the Draft Convention is signed and ratified,
the federal government will vest a state court with jurisdiction the state
court might not have under its constitution or long-arm statute.
The second jurisdiction base arises when "[a] person may be sued in a
Contracting State"44 for disputes involving contracts,4 5 maintenance, 46
tort,47 civil claims for criminal proceedings, 48 branch or agency opera-
Lugano and Brussels Conventions, "[p]ersons who are not nationals of the State in
which they are domiciled shall be governed by the rules of jurisdiction applicable to
nations of that State." Art. 2, Lugano Convention, supra note 2; Art. 2, Brussels Conven-
tion, supra note 2. Thus, the rendering court uses its domestic law to resolve legal
questions regarding domicile. The Inter-American Convention has similar language to
that of the Draft Convention. Art. 1(A) (1), Inter-American Convention, supra note 2.
41. See, e.g., Art. 1, Brussels Convention, supra note 2.
42. "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the ... treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988).
43. U.S. CoNsr. art. VI, cl. 2. A treaty is the equivalent of a federal statute by means
of the supremacy clause: "[A]lI Treaties made ... under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be
bound thereby." Id.
44. Art. 5, Draft Convention, supra note 33. This language is different from the
Lugano Convention's Article 5. The introductory language of the Lugano Convention
is: "A person domiciled in a Contracting State may, in another Contracting State, be
sued .... " Art. 5, Lugano Convention, supra note 2. The change in the Draft Conven-
tion, by eliminating "domiciled in a Contracting State," implies that any defendant may
be sued in any contracting state. This gives the Draft Convention a huge net in which
to ensnare non-member state defendants and enforce judgments against them in mem-
ber states' courts. In other words, this seems similar to the Brussels Convention jurisdic-
tional framework that the United States hopes to change by proposing a new
Convention.
The Draft Convention does not in Article 5 specifically list bases for jurisdiction.
Rather, it notes in explanatory brackets: "Set out acceptable bases; these bases must be
made available by all Contracting States." Art. 5, Draft Convention, supra note 33. It
then proposes "for illustrative purposes" parts of the Lugano Convention, 1971 Hague
Convention, and Inter-American Convention. Id. These illustrations conclude this sen-
tence in the text. See infra notes 45-57 and accompanying text.
45. Art. 5(1), Lugano Convention, supra note 2. The place for the suit depends on
the type of contract:
[I]n matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of performance of
the obligation in question; in matters relating to individual contracts of employ-
ment, this place is that where the employee habitually carries out his work, or if
the employee does not habitually carry out his work in any one country, this
place shall be the place of business through which he was engaged[.]
Id.
46. Art. 5(2), Lugano Convention, supra note 2.
47. Art. 5(3), Lugano Convention, supra note 2. The suit is heard "where the harm-
ful event occurred." Id.
48. Art. 5(4), Lugano Convention, supra note 2. This case is heard in the same
forum as the criminal proceeding, if the court has proper jurisdiction. Id.
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tions,4 9 trusts,50 cargo and freight salvage renumeration, 5 1 tangible mova-
ble property,52 immovable property,53 where the defendant did not
challenge jurisdiction,54 when the defendant was the plaintiff in a prior
action regarding this issue in the forum,55 if the forum was designated in a
forum selection agreement,56 and if no other forum is available. 57
The third Draft Convention jurisdiction base establishes special juris-
diction for contractual areas. The areas are complex situations (multiple
defendants, third-party defendants, and counterclaims),58 insurance,5 9
and particular consumer contracts. 60 The Draft Convention also has pro-
visions for special situations, including vesting courts with exclusive juris-
diction,61 prorogation of jurisdiction, 62 and the effects of a defendant's
appearance in court.63
b. The "Grey Area"
Unlike a true convention double, however, the U.S. proposal allows con-
tracting states to assume jurisdiction on bases ofjurisdiction not listed or
specified in the convention. Judgments resulting from the exercise of
49. Art. 5(5), Lugano Convention, supra note 2, and Art. IA(3), Inter-American
Convention, supra note 2. The suit is heard where the branch or agent is located.
50. Art. 5(6), Lugano Convention, supra note 2. Trust suits are heard in the trust's
domicile.
51. Art. 5(7), Lugano Convention, supra note 2.
52. Art. 10(4), 1971 Hague Convention, supra note 2, and Art. IB, Inter-American
Convention, supra note 2.
53. Art. 10(3), 1971 Hague Convention, supra note 2, and Art. IC, Inter-American
Convention, supra note 2.
54. Art. 10(6), 1971 Hague Convention, supra note 2.
55. Art. 10(7), 1971 Hague Convention, supra note 2.
56. Art. 10(5), 1971 Hague Convention, supra note 2, and Art. ID, Inter-American
Convention, supra note 2.
57. Art. 2, Inter-American Convention, supra note 2. Article 2 states:
[R]equirements for jurisdiction in the international sphere shall also be
deemed to be satisfied if, in the opinion of the judicial or other adjudicatory
authority of the State Party in which the judgment is to be given effect, the
judicial or other adjudicatory authority that rendered the judgment assumed
jurisdiction in order to avoid a denial ofjustice because of the absence of a
competent judicial or other adjudicatory authority.
Id.
58. Arts. 6 and 6A, Draft Convention, supra note 33. The Draft Convention refer-
ences Articles 6 and 6A of the Lugano Convention, Article 11 of the 1971 Hague Con-
vention, and Article 3 of the Inter-American Convention.
59. Arts. 7-12A, Draft Convention, supra note 33. The Draft Convention refers to
Articles 8-12A of the Lugano Convention.
60. Arts. 13-15, Draft Convention, supra note 33. The Draft Convention refers to
Articles 13-15 of the Lugano Convention.
61. Art. 16, Draft Convention, supra note 33. The Draft Convention references Arti-
cle 16 of the Lugano Convention.
62. Art. 17, Draft Convention, supra note 33. The Draft Conventions references
Article 17 of the Lugano Convention, Article 10(5) of the 1971 Hague Convention, and
Article 1A(4) of the Inter-American Convention.
63. Art. 18, Draft Convention, supra note 33. The Draft Convention references Arti-
cle 18 of the Lugano Convention, Article 10(6) of the 1971 Hague Convention, and
Article 1A(4) of the Inter-American Convention.
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such bases, known as the grey area, are not entitled to recognition under
the convention, although the enforcing state may grant recognition and
enforcement under its general law.64
It is this grey area which the United States hopes will ease acceptance
of its proposal. The grey area facilitates compromise by permitting states
to maintain their sovereignty by exercising black list jurisdiction if they so
choose. Thus, countries will not have to forgo parts of their legal systems.
Rather, they will know thatjudgments based on a black list basis will not be
granted automatic recognition and enforcement. A convention mixte
therefore, provides flexibility for contracting states; such flexibility will
help enable states to reach a final agreement.
c. The "Black List"
The U.S. proposal also contains a black list of impermissible jurisdictional
bases.65 In offering to proscribe some long-arm (called "exorbitant 66 )
bases, the United States hopes to attract Hague Conference member
states' attention. Just as the United States wants to eliminate the Brussels
and Lugano provisions permitting jurisdiction over non-domiciled defend-
ants, 67 so too do European countries want to end U.S. transient jurisdic-
tion, also known as "tag" service (which is essentially the same as the
European Conventions' exorbitant jurisdiction provisions).68 Transient
jurisdiction, or tag service, is the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a
person present in the forum, thus entailing the in-state service of process
on a defendant, no matter how temporary the in-state presence. Tag ser-
vice has been used in the United States to exercise personal jurisdiction
over foreign defendants, making them liable for enormous punitive dam-
age awards.6 9 Transient jurisdiction is not recognized outside of the
United States and is criticized by most U.S. commentators. 70 The United
64. Art. 3, Draft Convention, supra note 33. The text of the "grey area":
Suits may further be instituted in a Contracting State by virtue of grounds not
specified in Sections 1-6 of this Title [the "white list"] unless the ground in
question is enumerated in Article 4 [the "black list"].
Where the court of origin's jurisdiction rests on [the paragraph above], the
party that invoked jurisdiction is not entitled to seek recognition and enforce-
ment of any resultingjudgment under Title ll of this Convention. However, this
Convention shall not affect the ability of a Contracting State to afford recognition and
enforcement to such a judgment under its general law.
Id. (emphasis added).
65. Art. 4, Draft Convention, supra note 33.
66. Id.
67. Art. 4, Brussels Convention, supra note 2; Art. 4, Lugano Convention, supra note
2. Both articles read: "Persons who are not nationals of the State in which they are
domiciled shall be governed by the rules of jurisdiction applicable to the nationals of
that State."
68. The United States Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of tag service
(also known as transientjurisdiction) in Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495
U.S. 604 (1990).
69. See, e.g., Amusement Equipment, Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1985).
70. The Restatements, for example, argue that transient jurisdiction for foreigners
is rejected abroad and, therefore, should also not be allowed in the United States.
"Jurisdiction based on service of process on one only transitorily present in a state is no
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States Supreme Court, however, continues to uphold its consti-
tutionality.7 1
The Draft Convention does not specifically state the black list bases.
Instead, it refers to provisions of other conventions. 72 Article three of the
Lugano Convention lists specific statutes from each contracting state
which are forbidden bases ofjurisdiction against contracting state defend-
ants.73 The Draft Convention rejects listing specific statutes as "inappro-
priate."74 It proposes that "[instead, each exorbitant basis would be set
out in general terms."75
The Draft Convention then references a section of the 1971 Hague
Convention's Supplementary Protocol 76 "for illustrative purposes."77 Par-
agraph 4 of the Supplementary Protocol lists the following bases of juris-
diction as invalid: presence of defendant's property in the forum,78 the
plaintiff's nationality,79 the plaintiffs domicile, 80 the occurrence of
longer acceptable under international law if that is the only basis for jurisdiction and
the action in question is unrelated to that state." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FORaIN
RELATIONS LAw OF THE UNrrMD STATES § 421, Reporters' Note 4 (1987). Section 421
codifies this summary of international law. "In general, a state's exercise ofjurisdiction
to adjudicate with respect to a person or thing is reasonable if, at the timejursidction is
asserted[,] the person or thing is present in the territory of the state, other than transi-
torily .... " Id § 421(a).
71. "The short matter is that jurisdiction based on physical presence alone consti-
tutes due process because it is one of the continuing traditions of our legal system that
define the due process standard of 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice.'" Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 619 (quoting Interna-
tional Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945)). Burnham involved a New
Jersey defendant who was temporarily in California, the plaintiffs forum.
72. Art. 4, para. 4, Draft Convention, supra note 33.
73. E.g., Articles 14 and 15 of the French Civil Code, Article 77 of the Iceland Civil
Proceeding Act, and Article 99 of the Austrian Law on Court Jurisdiction. Art. 3,
Lugano Convention, supra note 2.
74. Art. 4, para. 4, Draft Convention, supra note 33.
75. Id.
76. Supplementary Protocol to the Hague Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of ForeignJudgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 1971 Hague Con-
vention, supra note 2, at 125 [hereinafter Supplementary Protocol].
77. Art. 4, para. 4, Draft Convention, supra note 33.
78. Para. 4(a), Supplementary Protocol, supra note 76:
the presence in the territory of the State of origin of property belonging to the
defendant, or the seizure by the plaintiff of property situated there, unless-
-the action is brought to assert proprietary or possessory rights in that prop-
erty, or arises from another issue relating to such property,
-the property constitutes the security for a debt which is the subject-matter
of the action[.]
Id.
79. Para. 4(b), Supplementary Protocol, supra note 76 ("the nationality of the
plaintiff").
80. Para. 4(c), Supplementary Protocol, supra note 76 ("the domicile, habitual resi-
dence or ordinary residence of the plaintiff within the territory of the State of origin
unless the assumption ofjurisdiction on such a ground is permitted by way of an excep-
tion made on account of the particular subject-matter of a class of contracts").
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defendant's business in the forum,8 ' transient jurisdiction,8 2 and the
plaintiff's "unilateral" forum selection.8 3 These are the "exorbitant" bases
ofjurisdiction that so vex both U.S. and non-U.S. defendants. An agree-
ment to prohibit these bases would help unify global commercial legality
and ease fears of malicious litigation.
d. Recognition and Enforcement Procedures
As in the Brussels and Lugano Conventions, recognition and enforcement
in the Draft Convention is straightforward. Ajudgment existing on white
list bases "shall be recognized in the other Contracting States."'84 As in the
Brussels and Lugano Conventions, the enforcing court may choose not to
enforce a seemingly valid judgment for public policy reasons.8 5 As the
purpose of the agreement is to simplify and to provide certainty in judg-
ment recognition, the recognition and enforcement procedures need not
be more complicated.
e. Effect on U.S. Law
The most important effect on U.S. law is that the United States must relin-
quish tag service on foreigners. Such a sacrifice is the carrot which is
enticing the Europeans (and the Japanese and Canadians) to join the
negotiations. The effect of this on a federal system (as in the United
States) is unclear. For example, if a French defendant receives service in
New York based on transient jurisdiction, a resulting default judgment
could be enforced in New York but not in New Jersey. The New York
enforcement is a matter of the state long-arn and enforcement statutes.8
6
81. Para. 4(d), Supplementary Protocol, supra note 76 ("the fact that the defendant
carried on business within the territory of the State of origin, unless the action arises
from that business").
82. Para. 4(e), Supplementary Protocol, supra note 76 ("service of a writ upon the
defendant within the territory of the State of origin during his temporary presence
there").
83. Para. 4(f), Supplementary Protocol, supra note 76 ("a unilateral specification of
the forum by the plaintiff, particularly in an invoice").
84. Art. 26, Draft Convention, supra note 33. The clause reads: "[A] judgment
given in a Contracting State that rests on ajurisdictional basis provided for in Article 2,
or in Articles 5-18, shall be recognized in the other Contracting States."
85. Art. 27, Draft Convention, supra note 33. The Draft refers to Article 27(1) of
the Lugano Convention, which reads: "Ajudgment shall not be recognized: (1) if such
recognition is contrary to public policy in the State in which recognition is sought[.]"
Lugano Convention, supra note 2.
86. It is possible that the treaty could divest the states of their international long-
arm jurisdiction. Congress could provide implementing legislation under the
supremacy clause making the treaty the sole source of international jurisdiction. Con-
gress has two choices in making this decision. First, it can make the Draft Convention
the sole source of international jurisdiction, regardless of whether the defendant is the
domiciliary of a signatory country. Second, it could make the Draft Convention con-
trolling of state international jurisdiction only in regard to defendants of signatory
countries. Where a defendant is not the domiciliary of a signatory country, state long-
arm statutes would still apply. Choosing the latter option may induce some countries to
sign the Draft Convention, thereby limiting their domiciliaries to Draft Convention
jurisdiction bases and not to transient jurisdiction.
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But enforcement in NewJersey against a foreign defendant would violate
the "black list" transient jurisdiction provision. In order to resolve such
anomalies, Congress could overturn Burnham v. Superior Court8 7 and ban
foreign (non-U.S. domiciliary) transientjurisdiction in the United States.
If the United States signs and ratifies ajudgment agreement, it will be
the first time Congress has exercised its Article IV constitutional power in
this manner.8 8 The entire body of the common law beginning with Hilton
v. Guyoi89 will be valid with respect to judgments emanating from non-
signatory countries. A new body of law regarding the interpretation of the
new convention will develop. It is therefore very important that the nego-
tiators pay attention to the United States Supreme Court's interpretations
of the Hague Service Convention 90 and the Hague Evidence Conven-
tion.9 1 The Court has interpreted both conventions as not being the
exclusive methods required to effectuate, respectively, service of process
or the taking of evidence abroad.9 2 The Draft Convention must be written
87. Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990). See supra notes
68 and 71.
88. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
89. Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1885).
90. Hague Convention on Service Abroad ofJudicial and Extrajudicial Documents
in Civil and Commercial Matters, 20 U.S.T. 361, T.I.A.S. No. 6638, 658 U.N.T.S. 163.
91. Hague Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, 23 U.S.T. 2555, T.I.A.S. No. 7444, 847 U.N.T.S. 231.
92. Volkswagenwerk AG v. Schlunk, 486 U.S. 694 (1988), held that U.S. plaintiffs
may serve process on foreign defendants by serving their agents within the United
States, rather than by complying with the Hague Service Convention's provisions
regarding extraterritorial service. The Supreme Court in dicta stated that the Service
Convention only provides the exclusive means for service abroad. "By virtue of the
Supremacy Clause, U.S. Const. Art. VI, the Convention pre-empts inconsistent methods
of service prescribed by state law in all cases to which it applies." Id. at 699. See also
Kadota v. Hosogai, 125 Ariz. 131, 136, 608 P.2d 68, 73 (1980)
([A]ppellee's argument that her compliance with [Arizona] Rule [of Civil Pro-
cedure] 4(e) (6) (iii) was sufficient service of process on the appellant fMils. The
[Hague Service Convention] ... specifically prohibits this method of service,
although the Arizona rules allow for it. The law is clear that state statutes are
abrogated to the extent that they are inconsistent with a treaty.).
Conflicting interpretations exist regarding article 19 of the Hague Service Conven-
tion. The Convention provides for each signatory country to have a Central Authority
which coordinates foreign requests for service of process. Article 19 permits countries
to allow service by methods legal in that country but not detailed in the Convention.
Some courts have held that this article provides for valid service if such service is in
accordance with the law of the state where service is made. See Lemme v. Wine ofJapan
Import, Inc., 631 F.Supp 456, 462-63 (E.D.N.Y. 1986); DeJames v. Magnificence Carri-
ers, Inc., 654 F.2d 280, 288 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1085 (1981).
But other courts have disagreed and held that only the Service Convention's deline-
ated service methods are valid means of serving process, regardless of foreign law. See
Teknekron Mgt. v. Quante Fernmeldtechnik, 115 F.R.D. 175, 176 (D. Nev. 1987); In re
Anschuetz & Co., 754 F.2d 602, 615 (5th Cir. 1985), vacated, 107 S. Ct. 3223 (1987).
The Convention's failure to specify in an article the Convention's exclusivity led to this
ambiguity and differing interpretations.
Similar ambiguity exists in the application of the Hague Evidence Convention. In
Soci&6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. District Court, 482 U.S. 522 (1987),
the Supreme Court held: "The text of the [Hague] Evidence Convention itself does
not modify the law of any contracting State, require any contracting State to use the
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so as to avoid being interpreted as non-exclusive. Such a result would
leave foreign courts open to examining recognition and enforcement
motions on their merits-the exact situation the United States hoped to
avoid when it proposed the Convention. The use of specified white list
and black list bases for jurisdiction must be clearly understood as either
permissible or impermissible jurisdiction bases so that no post-ratification
judicial interpretation negates the Draft Convention's purpose.
Another major effect on U.S. law is the federalization of state public
policy exceptions to judgment enforcement. Ratification of the Draft
Convention will bind the states by means of the supremacy clause.93 Thus
Article 27's public policy exception to recognition and enforcement will
be a federal public policy exception. State public policy rationales, up to
this point binding on federal courts,94 will now be reviewable by federal
courts. For over 200 years state public policy has been a matter of state
prerogative; it will now be seized by the federal branches of government.
It may behoove Congress to enact implementing legislation to ensure an
easy transition to public policy exceptions.
2. Current Status of Negotiations
The United States proposed in May 1992 that the Hague Conference
begin work on a Convention.95 The Hague Conference's Secretary Gen-
eral had the Conference's Permanent Bureau develop a working docu-
ment9 6 describing the proposal. The Secretary General then asked the
United States to submit a more extensive description of its proposal, which
it did in June of 1992, including a skeleton draft.97 The Special Commis-
sion of the Conference met in June 1992 and decided to submit the mat-
ter to a Working Group of experts.98 This panel endorsed the idea at its
November 1992 meeting.9 9 The 17th Session of the Hague Conference
took place in May 1993. The United States had hoped the Conference
would place the proposed Convention on a priority track, but the dele-
gates instead decided that the matter needed further study.'0 0
Convention procedures, either in requesting evidence or in responding to such
requests, or compel any contracting State to change its own evidence-gathering proce-
dures." Id.
93. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cL. 2. See supra note 4.
94. Erie R.P. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (holding that there is no federal
common law in diversity cases).
95. Hague Conference document L.c. ON No. 15 (92), supra note 1.
96. Hague Conference document Prel. Doc. No. 17, supra note 35.
97. Hague Conference, Paper Submitted by the United States, Another Hague Con-
vention on Recognition and Enforcement ofForeignJudgments: New Approaches and New Oppor-
tunities, September 1992 (on file with the Cornell International LawJournal).
98. Conclusions of the Special Commission of June 1992 on General Affairs and
Policy of the Conference, Prel. Doc. No. 18 of August 1992 (on file with the Cornell
International Law Journal).
99. Prel. Doc. No. 19, supra note 36.
100. Final Act, supra note 37, 32 I.L.M. at 1145. See also Minutes Nos. 3 and 4, May
21, 1993, Hague conference on Private International Law, Seventeenth Session, and
Working Documents Nos. 7 and 8, May 20, 1993.
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The Danish delegate, Mr. Philip, led the opposition. He argued that
"before deciding whether [a new convention] was necessary and to what
effect it would give rise to a clearer discussion concerning the necessity for
such an instrument was required [sic] ."101
He argued that the present regional system worked well but a multi-lateral
or global system was a very different proposition and should only be taken
cautiously, after consideration of all the advantages and disadvantages. Fur-
thermore, although any convention covering these matters clearly needs to
consider questions such as jurisdiction and "order publique" it should also
allow consideration of the substance of judgements [sic] before requiring
their recognition on a global basis. Therefore he considered that there
were profound problems associated with the project and that it was too
ambitious. He expressed a preference for a less ambitious project which
would move step by step towards the end result suggested ih [the U.S. pro-
posal]. Each of the steps would allow a period of reflection and an assess-
ment of the results before progressing to the next step. He suggested
starting with consideration of exorbitant jurisdiction and using article 59 of
the Brussels Convention as a starting point .... An ambitious plan such as
that suggested in [the U.S. proposal] would, he thought, prove
impossible.102
This argument had three points. First, that more study was necessary.
The reference to existing multilateral judgment treaties indicated Den-
mark's contentment with the Brussels and Lugano Conventions. Second,
the "order publique" refers to public policy exceptions. The Danes were
probably concerned that an open-ended public policy exception would
potentially spiral out of control. Third, the suggestion that "the substance
ofjudgements" [sic] be discussed "before requiring their recognition on a
global basis" referred to punitive damages. This must have been a hint to
other delegates that the U.S. proposal would require signatory countries
to enforce large U.S. damage awards. All three areas are of concern to
various delegations and spurred them to proceed with caution.
The delegates decided not to place the U.S. proposal on a priority
status. Instead, they approved a Danish suggestion that referred the pro-
posal to a Special Commission "to study further the problems involved in
drafting such a Convention .... to make proposals .... to suggest the
timing of such work, and that the Special Commission on General Matters
and Policy of the Conference make recommendatons to the Eighteenth
Session on further steps to be taken."' 03 The United States was able to
convince the delegates to amend one line of the Danish proposal. Instead
of having the Special Commission "be called in 1994,"104 it was to be "con-
101. Mr. Philip, Minutes No. 3, supra note 100, at 2.
102. Id.
103. Working Document No. 7, Commission I, Seventeenth Session, General Affairs,
Hague Conference on Private International Law, May 5, 1993 (on file with the Cornell
Interational Law Journa).
104. Id.
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stituted as soon as feasible."'10 5 The United States failed to convince the
delegates to speed the Special Commission when the delegates refused to
have the Special Commission on General Matters and Policy of the Con-
ference make its recommendations prior to the Eighteenth Session.1 6
The Convention proposal is still alive, but its expected completion date
has been extended from 1996 to 1998.107
H. Reynolds v. The International Amateur Athletic Federation
A. Background
Harry L. (Butch) Reynolds, Jr. is the 400 meter run world record
holder.10 8 He placed second in the 1988 Olympic Games.' 0 9 On August
12, 1990, he competed in the Herculis '90 International track and field
competition in Monte Carlo, Monaco. 1 0 After competing, he was asked
to submit a urine sample as part of the IAAF's drug-testing program. 111
Reynolds's sample was sent with others to the Lafage Laboratory in Paris,
France. Reynolds was informed that his sample tested positive for nan-
drolone, a banned performance-enhancing anabolic steroid. 112 Reynolds
was summarily suspended from competing for two years, a time period
which included the 1992 Olympics. 113 Reynolds immediately submitted a
sample to another laboratory, which tested negative for any banned sub-
stances."14 The IAAF denied Reynolds's appeals. 15
B. Legal Action
1. Reynolds I
Reynolds was forced to take legal action to regain his competitive status.' 16
Even though he was able to prove the French lab had mixed up the sam-
105. Working Document No. 8, Commission I, Seventeenth Session, General Affairs,
May 5, 1993, Hague Conference on Private International Law (on file with the Cornell
International LawJournal).
106. See Minutes No. 4, Commission I, Seventeenth Session, General Affairs, Hague
Conference on Private International Law, Meeting of May 20, 1993, at 5 (on file with
the Cornell International Law Journal). The vote defeating the U.S. amendment was 15
against, 12 in favor, and 5 abstentions. Id. See aroWorking Document No. 7, supra note
103, and Working Document No. 8, supra note 105.
107. Final Act, supra note 37.
108. Reynolds set the world record in Zurich in 1988 with a time of 43.29 seconds.
John Goodbody, US Court awards Reynolds record damages of Pounds 17, TrMEs, Dec. 4,
1992, available on LEXIS, News Library, Curnws File.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. The IAAF is the international governing body for track and field. See supra note
6. Drug testing in this context means for steroids (performance enhancements).
112. Reynolds I, 841 F.Supp. 1444, 1447 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
113. See Reynolds Out of Money, Out of Races, supra note 7.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. His original suit, Reynolds v. The Athletics Congress, No. C-2-91-0003 (S.D.
Ohio 1991), was dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 1991 U.S. App.
LEXIS 12277 (6th Cir.June 11, 1991) (per curiam). Reynolds H arose from his suit to
compete in the U.S. Olympic Trials and to receive monetary damages.
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ples, his protestations were ignored. The IAAF refused to admit it had
made a mistake.
Reynolds lost endorsement and prize money with each missed compe-
tition.117 Getting nowhere with the IAAF's adjudicatory process, Reynolds
turned to the U.S. courts. He sued in federal district court in Ohio, seek-
ing reinstatement for Fifth Amendment due process violations by the
IAAF.118 The court dismissed his Fifth Amendment claim for lack ofjuris-
diction and his other claims were stayed pending compliance with the
Amateur Sports Act."19 The Sixth Circuit affirmed the Fifth Amendment
claim dismissal and vacated the stay on lack of subject matter jurisdiction
grounds,120 forcing the suit's complete dismissal.
2. Reynolds II
With the U.S. Olympic Trials rapidly approaching, Reynolds returned to
court. The district court issued a temporary restraining order on June 19,
1992, forbidding TAC or the IAAF from preventing Reynolds's competing
in the Trials. 12' The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court later that
day.12 2 But Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens, sitting as Circuit
Justice, reversed the Sixth Circuit on June 20.123 The full Supreme Court
denied TAC's same day appeal. 12 4
Reynolds won his heat and qualified in the semi-final for the final.
He placed fifth, however, and was awarded a spot as an alternate on the
4X400 relay team.125 The International Olympic Committee (IOC)
announced that it would not allow Reynolds to run in Barcelona. 126 Reyn-
olds chose not to test the IOC. The IAAF extended Reynolds's ban, set to
expire the day after the Olympics, through the end of 1992. Reynolds had
contracts to run in Europe and stood to lose a great deal of money.
Reynolds then returned to court to adjudicate his breach of contract
and damages claims, which he increased as a result of the ban's extension.
The IAAF refused to appear, claiming it was not subject to the jurisdiction
of any court in the world.12 7 On December 3, 1992,Judge Kinneary of the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Ohio found for Reynolds
and awarded him $6 million in compensatory damages and $18 million in
trebled punitive damages.128 The IAAF announced its intention to appeal
117. Reynolds estimated he lost a total of $4-5 million. For example, Nike refused to
continue its sponsorship contract. See Reynolds II, 841 F. Supp. at 1451.
118. See Reynolds, No. C-2-91-0003.
119. Id.
120. Reynolds, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 12277.
121. Reynolds I, supra note 9.
122. Reynolds v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, No. 92-3596, 1992 U.S. App. LEXIS
14058, at *6 (6th Cir. 1992).
123. Reynolds v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 112 S.Ct. 2512 (1992).
124. Reynolds v. Int'l Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 120 L. Ed. 864 (1992).
125. Moore, supra note 10.
126. Reynolds , 841 F. Supp. at 1444.
127. See Moore, supra note 10.
128. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, No. C-2-92-456 (S.D. Ohio
Nov. 1992) (judgment award).
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but could only litigate the jurisdiction issue, as it waived any other
defenses in refusing to defend. 129 Primo Nebiolo, the IAAF president,
announced that "Reynolds will never collect. Never, never. He can live
200 years."'130 Reynolds responded by winning a world championship in
July.1
31
3. Enforcement/Garnishment
Reynolds, not deterred, received a garnishment order from the rendering
court, and set out to enforce his judgment in the United States.13 2 The
LAAF does not have assets in the United States, but it does have sponsors
who pay quarterly dues to the TAAF. Reynolds attempted to garnish those
dues.' 3 3 His initial attempt was successful when, in August 1993, a district
court judge ordered Mobil Oil to pay $691,667 to the court to hold in
escrow pending appeal.' T
4. Reversal for Lack ofJurisdiction
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit reversed Reynolds's dis-
trict court victory and remanded for dismissal.' 3 5 The Court held that
Ohio had no jurisdiction over the IAAF. 136 The United States Supreme
Court denied certiorari.137 Just as Nebiolo claimed,138 the IAAF proved
beyond the reach of U.S. law.139
129. Reynolds wins $700,000judgment ITHAcAJouRNAL, Aug. 28, 1993, at B1.
130. Kirshenbaum, supra note 14.
131. Id.
132. ITHAcAJouRNAL, supra note 129.
133. See Reynolds Out of Money, Out of Races, supra note 7.
134. Randy Harvey, LA TIMES, Aug. 28, 1993, at C2. The payment was Mobil Oil's
May 21-August 27 quarterly dues. John Barron & Dick Patrick, Sprinter Reynolds grabs
gold on and off the track, USA TODAY, Aug. 30, 1993, at 11C. Appearing with Reynolds on
Larry King LivA Reynolds's attorney John Gall said that Reynolds eventually garnished
$1.4 million. Larry King Live (CNN television broadcast, Feb. 14, 1994), transcript #
1043-2, available in LEXIS, News Library, Cumws File.
Mars "escapedjudgment... arguing that its sponsorship agreement [with the IAAFI
was entered into by its subsidiary in the United Kingdom." Harvey, supra- Nike, Pepsi-
Cola, and Coca-Cola "had already paid their sponsorship money to the IAAF and, thus,
Reynolds could not intercept that money." Id.
135. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 1994),
rehjg en bane denied, No. 93-3884, 1994 U.S. App LEXIS 16815 (6th Cir. 1994).
136. This Note will not review U.S.jurisdiction law. For an easy to read summary of
U.S. law and the law of other countries, see Joseph J. Simeone, Essay, The Recognition
and Enforceability of Foreign CountryJudgments, 37 ST. Louis U. LJ. 341 (1993).
137. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 115 S. Ct. 423 (1994).
138. See Reynolds II, 841 F. Supp. 1444, 1452 (S.D. Ohio 1992), for the IAAF'sjudg-
ment claims.
139. For discussions of the various Reynolds cases, see 6th Circuit Opinion Notes, 73
MICH. B.J. 710-11 (July 1994); Anthony T. Polvino, Comment, Arbitration as Preventative
Medicine For Olympic Ailments: The International Olympic Committee's Court of Arbitration For
Sport and the Future For the Settlement of International Sporting Disputes, 8 EMORY INT'L L.
REv. 347 (1994);JillJ. Newman, Note, The Race Does Not Always Go to the Stronger orFaster
Man... But to the One Who Goes to Court! An Examination of Reynolds v. International
Amateur Athletic Fed'n, et al., 1 SPoRTS LAw.J. 205 (1994); HilaryJoy Hatch, Note, On
Your Mark, Get Set, Stop! Drug-Testing Appeals in the International Amateur Athletic Federa-
tion, 16 Lov. LA INT'L & CoMP. LJ. 537 (1994); Nelson, supra note 8.
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The court of appeals held that under Ohio's long-arm statute, the
district court did not have personal jurisdiction over the IAAF.140 Its anal-
ysis followed three avenues. First, the court held that the IAAF did not
transact business in Ohio, thereby avoiding Reynolds's contract claim.
The court noted that "[e]ven if the IAAF purposefully availed itself of
Ohio privileges, the claims against the IAAF must arise out of the IAAF's
activities in Ohio."' 4 ' The IAAF's actions all arose outside of Ohio: the
drug test was administered in Monaco and tested in France, all IAAF press
releases were issued from the United Kingdom, and all correspondence to
Reynolds was sent from the United Kingdom. All told, "the IAAF is based
in England, owns no property and transacts no business in Ohio, and does
not supervise U.S. athletes in Ohio or elsewhere. Its contacts with Reyn-
olds in Ohio are superficial, and are insufficient to create the requisite
minimum contacts for personal jurisdiction."142 Finally, the court of
appeals found no evidence of an actual contract "made, performed, or
breached in Ohio."' 43 Therefore the court of appeals found that jurisdic-
tion did not exist under Ohio's "transacting any business" section of its
long-arm statute.
Second, the court of appeals held that the Ohio section regarding
jurisdiction based on tortious injury was also insufficient to gain jurisdic-
tion over the IAAF. To achieve jurisdiction based on tortious injury, the
IAAF must have had minimum contacts with Ohio.'" In short, the court
found that the IAAF's actions neither occurred in Ohio nor were inten-
tionally directed to have effect in Ohio. 145
Finally, the court held that Reynolds could not gain personal jurisdic-
tion over the IAAF based on TAG's agency status. The court early in its
opinion said "we agree with the district court that TAG is an agent of the
IAAF." 46 But the court of appeals found that TAG, although acting as the
140. 23 F.3d at 1115-21.
141. Id. at 1116-17.
142. Id. at 1119.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 1120. The court ofappeals looked to Calder v.Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984),
for guidance concerning minimum contacts.
We find Calder distinguishable for several reasons. First, the press release
concerned Reynolds's activities in Monaco, not Ohio. Second, the source of
the controversial report was the drug sample taken in Monaco and the labora-
tory testing in France. Third, Reynolds is an international athlete whose profes-
sional reputation is not centered in Ohio. Fourth, the defendant itself did not
publish or circulate the report in Ohio; Ohio periodicals disseminated the
report. Fifth, Ohio was not the "focal point" of the press release. The fact that
the IAAF could foresee that the report would be circulated and have an effect
in Ohio is not, in itself, enough to create personal jurisdiction. Finally,
although Reynolds lost Ohio corporate endorsement contracts and appearance
fees in Ohio, there is no evidence that the IAAF knew of the contracts or of
their Ohio origin. Ca~der is a much more compelling case for finding personal
jurisdiction.
(citation omitted). 23 F.3d at 1120.
146. Id. at 1118.
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IAAF's agent, did not subject the IAAF to personal jurisdiction.1 47 The
court noted that the IAAF did not waive its personal jurisdiction defense
by failing to appear, because it did not authorize TAC to appear on its
behalf.148 TAG predicated its intervention, which began when Reynolds
moved for the temporary restraining order enabling him to enter the U.S.
Olympic Trials in 1992, on the grounds that "it was required to uphold
IAAF regulations, and contended that 'TAC, a member of the IAAF... is
bound by the decision declaring plaintiff ineligible; and thus under the
Amateur Sports Act, TAC may not permit him to participate in the
Olympic Trials.""a4 9 The court decided that TAC operated on its own voli-
tion, even though "it was required to uphold IAAF regulations." What the
court failed to note is that it was the IAAF that required TAC to uphold
the IAAF regulations, because TAC is a member of the IAAF.
If the court's rationale were applied in a typical business context, for-
eign corporations with agents or subsidiaries in the United States would
always be immune from jurisdiction as long as the parent company could
establish that it did not conduct any business in the forum and did not
direct the legal activities of its U.S. representative. That is exactly what the
IAAF has done, and the court let it succeed in escapingjurisdiction. The
court argued that "[t]here is no indication that the IAAF authorized or
even requested TAC to appear,"150 but rather that TAC instead "was carry-
ing out its statutory duty under the Amateur Sports Act and was not acting
as the LAAF's agent when it intervened."'15 This argument fails to realize
that TAC's sole existence is to serve as the IAAF's U.S. representative. As
TAC was "required to uphold IAAF regulations," it did not need an
explicit instruction from the IAAF to intervene.
In concluding, the court said "we do not believe that holding the
IAAF amenable to suit in Ohio court under the facts of this case comports
with 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."1 52 The IAAF
does not use "fair play and substantial justice" when dealing with its ath-
letes, and the court was wrong to condone such behavior.
-i. Could Reynolds Enforce Under the Proposed Hague Convention?
Reynolds sought to enforce his award only in the United States because
foreign countries, particularly European countries,153 frown upon sizeable
U.S. punitive damage awards. To complete his enforcement, Reynolds
potentially could have sought garnishment from the Atlanta Committee
147. Id. at 1121.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Reynolds v. International Amateur Athletic Fed'n, 23 F.3d 1110 (6th Cir. 1994),
rehk en banc denied, No. 93-3884, 1994 U.S. App. LEXIS 16815 (6th Cir. 1994).
151. Id.
152. Id. (quoting Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113
(1987)).
153. See generally ANDREAS F. LOwENFELD, INTERNATIONAL LITIGATION AND ARBITRA-
TION 420-56 (1993).
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for the Olympic Games (AGOG), the IOC, and the USOC (all are spon-
sors of the IAAF for the 1996 Olympics).154
Reynolds would not have had to threaten the 1996 Olympic Games if
he could have enforced his fulljudgment abroad. Several U.S. IAAF spon-
sors avoided garnishment by paying the IAAF through foreign subsidiaries.
Also, the IAAF has several non-United States sponsors Reynolds could have
garnished. Furthermore, the IAAF has assets abroad.' 55 If the United
States was a party to a comprehensive judgment treaty, Reynolds could
have pursued his claim more efficiently and effectively. The draft Hague
Convention, however, would not necessarily have permitted Reynolds to
enforce his award abroad.
A. Jurisdiction
For Reynolds to be able to enforce his award in a Draft Convention con-
tracting state, the jurisdiction of his judgment award must rest on a white
list jurisdictional basis.' 5 6 Assuming the court must be able to exercise
jurisdiction over the defendant based on statutory or constitutional grant
of authority (and is not granted jurisdiction by the effect of the Draft Con-
vention as a federal statute), the district court must look to the Ohio long
arm statute' 5 7 to gain personal jurisdiction over the IAAF. It must do so
because Reynolds sued the IAAF, a nonresident defendant, in federal
court based on diversity jurisdiction.158
There appear to be only two white list bases available to Reynolds
under the Ohio long-arm statute. The first basis is contract. Article 5(1)
of the Lugano Convention' 59 states that "the courts for the place of per-
formance of the [contract] obligation in question" have jurisdiction. 160
While Reynolds was not officially under contract from the IAAF, he was
required to adhere to its rules.' 6 ' In return for such adherence, the dis-
154. See Rodda, supra note 6.
155. Reynolds , 841 F. Supp. 1444, 1451 (S.D. Ohio 1992).
156. For a description of white list jurisdiction, see supra part I.B.1.a.
157. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.382 (Anderson 1991). Reynolds sued in Ohio
because that is his residence.
158. Reynolds f, 841 F. Supp. at 1449. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1988) (vesting
federal courts with original jurisdiction in diversity of citizenship cases) and Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (federal courts sitting in diversity jurisdiction apply
state substantive law).
159. The Draft Convention refers to parts of the Lugano Convention, the 1971
Hague Convention, and the Inter-American Convention for its white list. Title II, Draft
Convention, supra note 33. See supra part I.B.l.a.
160. Art. 5(1), Lugano Convention, supra note 2.
161. "Competition under I.A.A.F. rules is restricted to amateur athletes who are
under the jurisdiction of a [recognized national track and field organization (e.g.,
TAC)], and who are eligible to compete under I.A.A.F. rules." Rule 52, Restriction of
Competition to Amateurs, IAAF OFmc&.L HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 52. In order to
compete in the Olympics, an athlete "must comply with the Olympic Charter as well as
with the rules of the IF [International Federation] as approved by the IOC .... " Rule
45, Eligibility Code, OLYMPIC CHARTER, supra note 6, at 58. A U.S. track and field ath-
lete also must be a member of TAC. As a national governing body, TAC has the exclu-
sive authority to "designate individuals and teams to represent the United States in
international amateur athletic competition (other than the Olympic Games and the
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trict court found that a contractual basis existed between Reynolds and the
IAAF because the "IAAF makes eligibility determinations with respect to
Ohio athletes-including Mr. Reynolds,"1 62 and as a result, the IAAF
"arguably enters into a contractual relationship with those athletes."'16 3
The court cited as evidence of this relationship Reynolds's receipt of
money for travel to IAAF competitions and the fact that the IAAF "also
receives substantial monies from the broadcast of its meets."'61 4 Thus, the
"place of performance for the obligation in question"'6 5 is Ohio because
that is where both parties receive their benefits of the contractual
relationship. 166
The second white list basis for jurisdiction over the IAAF in Ohio is
tort. Article 5(3) of the Lugano Convention places the adjudication of a
tort "where the harmful event occurred."' 6 7 The Ohio long-arn statute
permits jurisdiction over a person who causes "tortious injury by an act or
omission in this state."' 68 The district court found tort jurisdiction over
the IAAF because its public suspension of Reynolds was defamatory and
interfered with Reynolds's endorsement contracts.' 69 Commission of a
tort in the forum granted the court jurisdiction to hear the case.
Contract and tort are the only white list bases available to Reynolds
under the Draft Convention. 170 The only other possible bases are branch
or agency operations and when the defendant does not challenge jurisdic-
tion. The Lugano and Inter-American Conventions provide the forum for
Pan-American Games)...." 36 U.S.C. § 393 (1988). The USOC "exercise[s] exclusive
jurisdiction ... over all matters pertaining to the participation of the United States in
the Olympic Games and in the Pan-American Games." 36 U.S.C. § 374 (1988).
162. Reynolds , 841 F. Supp. at 1451.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Art. 5(1), Lugano Convention, supra note 2.
166. This "place of performance" basis is the only Article 5(1) contract basis that
Reynolds could use to establish personal jurisdiction over the IAAF in Ohio. The other
basis involves an individual employment contract. The situs for suit is either "where the
employee habitually carries out his work," or if there is no habitual place in one coun-
try, then "this place shall be the place of business through which he was engaged." Id.
There is no actual employment contract between Reynolds and the IAAF or TAG, only
his required compliance with their rules and regulations. See supra note 161. Reynolds
had no habitual place where he ran because the competitions were held in different
locations around the world. The default rule to this is also not applicable because "the
place of business" where Reynolds was "engaged" must have been either the IAAF's
headquarters in London or TAG's headquarters in Louisville, Kentucky. It was at these
headquarters where Reynolds's eligibility was determined and money was disbursed.
The place of business cannot be Ohio because Reynolds'sjob-running-took place in
the countries where the competitions were held.
167. Art. 5(3), Lugano Convention, supra note 2. See supra note 47.
168. Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.382 (A) (3) (Anderson 1991).
169. The court held: "The uncontroverted allegations of defamation and interfer-
ence with business relationships both make out a prima facie case that the IAAF has
committed a tortious act which has injured an Ohio resident, and it must reasonably
have been expected to do so." Reynolds , 841 F. Supp. at 1451.
170. For an enumeration of white list bases, see supra part I.B.l.a.
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a branch or agency suit at the location of the branch or agency.' 7 ' TAG is
not located in Ohio. As for the defendant not challenging jurisdiction,
the Ohio long-arm statute does not provide this as a basis for
jurisdiction. 172
The court of appeals held that the LAAF's actions were not directed at
Ohio, and therefore Reynolds could not use the Ohio long-arm statute to
gain jurisdiction over the IAAF. But the Draft Convention overcomes this
problem. By signing the Draft Convention, other countries consent to the
exercise of white list jurisdiction bases over their citizens. The Draft Con-
vention therefore could be seen as weakening the strictness of contact
required by the court of appeals. The district court's findings of IAAF
action in Ohio would be enough action to satisfy the Draft Convention.
Although jurisdiction over the IAAF is possible under the Ohio long-
arm statute and under the white list, the exercise ofjurisdiction must also
comport with due process.' 73 If the district court hears the case based on
diversity jurisdiction, then the due process test is found in the 14th
Amendment. 174 Its mandate requires the IAAF to have minimum contacts
with the forum and that the maintenance of the suit does not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." 175 The district
court found no due process violations.' 76
Jurisdiction under the Draft Convention may require a Fifth Amend-
ment due process test because the Draft Convention would have the same
effect as a federal statute. It is also possible that because this is a treaty,
there may not be a due process problem for contracting state defendants.
But there may be such a problem for non-contracting state defendants
caught in an exorbitant jurisdiction web.
B. Recognition and Enforcement
Reynolds should be able to enforce his judgment in contracting states.
Hisjudgment comports with Draft Convention Article 26 in that it rests on
"a jurisdictional basis provided for in... Articles 5-18."'177 In fact, Reyn-
olds's judgment rests on two bases, the contract and tort bases.
Article 26 uses mandatory language that helps Reynolds. The article
says that ajudgment founded on an approved basis "shall be recognized in
the other Contracting States."178 Also, Article 29 prohibits revision au
fond.179 Thus, there is only one exception that would permit a contracting
171. Art. 5(5), Lugano Convention, supra note 2, and Art. 1A(3), Inter-American
Convention, supra note 2.
172. See Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2307.382 (Anderson 1991).
173. International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
174. Id.
175. Id. at 316.
176. Reynolds I, 841 F. Supp. at 1453.
177. Art. 26, Draft Convention, supra note 33.
178. Id. (emphasis added).
179. Revision on the merits. Art. 29, Draft Convention, supra note 33. The Draft
Convention refers for "illustrative purposes" to Article 29 of the Lugano Convention
and Article 8 of the 1971 Hague Convention. Id.
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state to refuse to enforce the judgment: public policy. Article 27(1) per-
mits contracting states to refuse to enforce judgments based on a domestic
rationale.' 8 0 It is this exception that Western European courts have used
to bar enforcement of large U.S. punitive damage awards. 181 But the Arti-
cle 29 prohibition should protect U.S. judgments in similar actions. The
United States could ensure protection of its judgments by limiting the
public policy exceptions permitted in the Draft Convention.
C. Punitive Damages
A core aspect to U.S. adoption of the Draft Convention must include
European (and global) willingness to enforce large U.S. punitive damage
awards. To achieve the successful completion of the Draft Convention,
the United States must compromise and accept some limit on the size of
these awards if it expects its negotiating partners to accept the enforce-
ment of any punitive damage award. There are three possible solutions.
First, there could be an absolute cap on the total amount of punitive
damages available for enforcement. This could be determined by a flat
percentage. For example, only 25% of punitive damage awards in excess
of $100,000 may be enforced. This is not an acceptable solution, however,
as it unfairly limits plaintiffs who deservingly hold very high awards. For
example, Reynolds had $18 million in punitive damages. That is a large
amount, but it is only three times his compensatory damages. The IAAF
deserves to be punished for its outrageous conduct, and foreign countries
should participate in enforcing this punishment.182 Any set amount
would also soon become superseded by inflation.
Second, there could be a scale based on the amount of the punitive
damage. For example, a plaintiff could collect 50% of the first million
dollars, 25% of the second, 12.5% of the third, and so forth. Reynolds
would thus collect about $999,992.18 in punitive damages. As shown by
Reynolds's $17 million hit, this plan would severely reduce large U.S.
awards enforceable abroad. This plan eliminates the problem of the cap,
but it still may succumb to inflationary pressures. To compensate for that
risk, the base amounts could be indexed either to a global inflation rate or
the inflation rate of either the rendering state or the enforcing state.
180. Art. 27(1), Draft Convention, supra note 33. The Draft Convention refers for
illustrative purposes to Article 27(1) of the Lugano Convention and Article 5 (1) of the
Hague Convention. Id.
181. See Solimene v. B. Grauel & Co., [1989] RIW 988 (Federal Republic of Germany
court refused to enforce a $275,000 punitive damage claim becausejudgment rendered
by a jury (in Massachusetts) and similar cases are tried in Germany before a judge,
German and U.S. product liability laws are different, and the size of the award was
higher than a German court could grant); S.A.C. Inc. v. F. &J., 52 BGHZ 31 (1970)
(German court held a New York court did not have jurisdiction to hear counterclaim).
182. All countries have an interest in reigning in the IAAF's seemingly omnipotent
power. Several atheletes have followed Reynolds's lead and challenged doping suspen-
sions in their home courts. See Iain Macleod, Drugs in Spor4 DAiLY TELEGRAPH, Dec. 13,
1994, at 32.
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Third, a Hague Conference panel could determine the proper puni-
tive damage award based on a range of factors. The factors could include
the nature of the damage suffered, the extent of pain and suffering
incurred, prospects for rehabilitation, future medical expenses, punish-
ment of the defendant, the plaintiffs pre-harm financial condition, the
defendant's pre-harm financial condition, and the plaintiffs cost of living
and inflation rate. Binding arbitation before the International Chamber
of Commerce could be the exclusive appeal from the panel.
Two enforcement questions remain. First, can the plaintiff enforce as
fully as possible in the rendering country and thus avoid limiting the size
of the award? That is, could Reynolds gain jurisdiction over the IAAF by
either the Ohio long-arm statute or the white list and only enforce in the
United States, thereby avoiding a punitive damages cap? He could
enforce as he tried by garnishing IAAF dues and attack the Atlanta Olym-
pics by garnishing in 1996. Second, can the plaintiff, if he must enforce
under a cap scheme as outlined above, enforce the maximum allowed in
each country, or will he be given one chance in one country only? The
answer to both questions should be to allow the plaintiff to collect as much
of the award as easily as possible.
Condusion
Anyjudgment treaty the United States signs must permit the enforceability
of a Reynolds-type judgment. Such a judgment involves an innocent U.S.
plaintiff maliciously harmed by a non-U.S. defendant which insists it is
immune from judicial authority. The United States needs a judgment
convention which will protect its citizens from such defendants. The Draft
Convention meets this requirement. Under the Draft Convention, Reyn-
olds has jurisdiction in the United States over the IAAF. He therefore has
the power to force foreign courts to recognize and enforce his judgment.
If Reynolds had begun his suit with the ability easily to enforce his judg-
ment, the IAAF probably would not have been so obstructionist. A settle-
ment could have been reached, thereby avoiding any threats to the
international athletic competition-and in particular the 1996 Olympic
Games. It will be a shame if the Atlanta Games are hindered by a garnish-
ment order invoked by another of its star atheletes for mistreatment by his
federation.
It will be a further shame if the Draft Convention is not enacted.
United States plaintiffs deserve to be treated fairly in international litiga-
tion. The United States must use pressure, if need be, to convince other
countries to enact the Draft Convention. The greatest means of pressure
is to return to Hilton v. Guyotjurisprudence and have U.S. courts no longer
enforce foreign judgments where the rendering court will conduct a merit
review of a U.S. judgment. The threat of equal enforcement treatment
hopefully will be enough of a threat to spur the completion and ratifica-
tion of the Draft Convention by Hague Conference member states. Only
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when that occurs will U.S. plaintiffs be given their rightful treatment in the
global legal system.

